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THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERATIVE 
FISCAL POLICY 
Abstract 
In a competitive two-country ·overlapping generations model with perfect 
capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto 
optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without 
1
coordination of national fiscal policies when the fiscal arsenal is restricted 
to ,lump-sum taxes: and government borrowing. Cooperation is required to 
achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social 
welfare functions. Cooperation and international side payments are required 
to .achieve ..an-: optimum·.•.with.respect to a utilitarian global ·1social ·welfare­
function. 
Without international lump-sum transfers, when distortionary taxes on 
capital income are permitted, Pareto, optima with respect to national social 
welfare functions and global social welfare optima will not be individual 
Pareto: optima:; .ef.f:iciency. is traded-off .for. a.,more desirable intergenerational 
and international distribution of resources. 
With nationally provided international public goods, the achievement of 
individual Pareto efficiency requires coordination of public spending but not 
of financing. 
KEY WORDS: policy coordination, .fiscal policy, Pareto optimality, social 
welfare 
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THE VELFARE ECONOMICS OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERA.TIVE FISCAL POLICY 
llillem H. Buiter and Kenneth M. Kletzer 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Full international integration of·. commodity and··· financial markets 
appears to leave little scope for countries to adopt policies to gain 
national advantage in world markets. Under free trade and unified tax 
regimes the set of fiscal policies available to national policy makers is 
severely limited. In the absence of Ricardian equivalence however lump-sum 
transfers between households within a country can alter the pattern of 
national saving and.consumption, allowing a government to exploit the 
country's size in world trade, and international lending and borrowing. 
The use of intergenerational transfers between citizens for pursuing 
nationalistic welfare objectives is studied in an overlapping generations 
economy. Redistribution across generations either through balanced-budget 
unfunded social security retirement schemes or public sector 
v · · -'-deficit-finance. with lump- sum taxes and transfers allows a national planner 
to affect the country's static and intertemporal terms of trade when trade 
restrictions or discriminatory taxation of asset income by source or 
residence are unavailable, say due to international agreements. 
A_major issue is whether cooperative,,policy formation by governments 
of interdependent economies is desirable for allocational efficiency. The 
absence of distortionary taxes implies that no overall loss in world 
surplus need result from the strategic use of lump-sum transfers. Lump-sum 
intergenerational transfer schemes designed to attain national welfare 
goals do not create departures from Pareto optimality in the world economy. 
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Such policies do effect redistributions of total surplus between foreign 
residents and home country citizenry . 
. Ve adopt an utilitarian objective for each.policy maker in a 
two-country model which implies that.the.global .command optimum is-time 
consistent ..It also implies that the national command optimum for a single 
- country facing a passive second country will be time consistent provided a 
sufficient set of distortionary tax instruments can be used. The utility 
of all current alive and yet to be born generations is discounted 
exponentially to the present. For simplicity, in all but one of our 
examples, we assume that the social rate of discount is constant. This 
utilitarian social welfare function which is used by Calvo and Obstfeld 
[1988] is similar to ones proposed by Samuelson [1967, 1968] but requires 
no constraints on government behavior to assure time consistency of the 
command optima. 
The adoption of a social welfare function for the government in each 
country introduces a distinction between intertemporal allocations which 
... ,are Pareto optimal .with .respect;.to all household preferences (the usual 
sense) and ones which are Pareto optimal with respect to national policy 
makers' preferences. Because the national social welfare functions are 
strictly utilitarian, optima with respect to planners' preferences are a 
.subset of the full set of Pareto optima. Lump-sum 1redistribution schemes-,,, ""·­
under free trade and capital mobility chosen by utilitarian planners are 
shown to assure that a competitive equilibrium allocation is a Pareto 
optimum. Because it does not benefit either social planner, dynamic 
inefficiency of the equilibrium plan can be avoided using noncooperative 
national lump-sum tax policies without international side payments. 
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However, a noncooperative equilibrium in lump-sum tax and transfer plans 
does not assure Pareto optimality.with 0 respect to :national social planners' ,.. 
.. preferences. Therefore coordination is not necessary-for allocational 
efficiency in the standard Pareto sense but is required to attain 
efficiency with.respect to.policy makers' preferences. 
In our analysis we allow only intertemporal international trade that 
is borrowing and lending or international trade in claims on capital stocks 
(these are equivalent in this model). The generalization to study the 
effects of lump-sum tax policies on the commodity terms of trade in each 
period is contained in Buiter and Kletzer [1990b]. The impact of lump-sum 
taxation in the absence of Ricardian equivalence on key relative prices is 
demonstrated with only one relative price, the world interest- -rate, each 
period. Ve assume that capital is perfectly mobile internationally. ve· 
also assume away any ability of individual.governments to use national 
seigniorage to finance fiscal deficits by studying a nonmonetary economy. 
In the second section the two-country model and notation are 
.introduced. The welfare .economics of coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal 
policies are discussed in the third section. Three criteria are presented. 
The first is Pareto optimality with respect to household preferences, the 
second is Pareto optimality with respect to the two national planners' 
preferences, and the third is optimality with •.respect to a global 
utilitarian social welfare objective. If only lump-sum taxes and transfers 
between households within each country-separately are allowed (that is-each 
national authority is subject to a national solvency constraint without any 
international side payments), then a noncooperative equilibrium choice of 
policies achieves a Pareto optimal allocation of resources with respect to 
individual household preferences. Coordination between governments in the 
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selection of these fiscal policies is necessary in general to attain a 
· Pareto optimum with respect to :the two national planners' objectives ·in a·, ,,, 
competitive equilibrium with free capital mobility. llliile separate but 
• coordinated fiscal policies are necessary -to achieve nationalistic planner--,··.. 
Pareto efficiency, ,optimization.of global objectives· requires international 
lump-'sumtransfers. If these are infeasible, there are two sets·of 
policies that can be used to pursue the global second-best. The first 
involves the use of lump-sum national intergenerational redistribution to 
influence the world rate of interest and thus the international 
distribution of income between debtors and creditors. In addition, the 
international distribution of income can be altered by policies which 
affect the payments to the internationally immobile factor, labor in this 
model. Wage differentials are created by subsidizing investment in one 
country and trucing it in the other in the presence of perfect capital 
mobility. 
Throughout this paper, we allow unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum 
..,/!. ✓.¥"·'nationaL(truc"''and*..transfer.. schemes in our analysis. In Buiter and Kletzer 
[1990a] we show that in an infinite-horizon economy fiscal policies 
composed of age-independent lump-sum truces and transfers with deficit 
finance subject to a suitable public sector solvency constraint are 
entirely equivalent to (balanced budget)•unfunded.social security 
retirement schemes. That is each set of policies supports the same set of 
intertemporal consumption plans. As Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] show, 
age-independent transfer schemes which are optimal for the utilitarian 
. planner require an infinite-horizon economy to ensure that they are also 
time-consistent (see also, Hillier and Malcomson [1984]). 
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Following Vilson [1981], and O'Connell and Zeldes [1988], Calvo and 
Obstfeld demonstrate. that in the case-of,the -optimal,lump- sum tax policy, 
with age-independent transfers the usual form of the government solvency 
constraint does not hold. Therefore, as in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a], we 
, modify the solvency 0 constraints to allow deficit-financed.age-' independent·. 
transfer and tax schemes. 
The fourth section analyzes optimum policy for a single country with 
national chauvinistic utilitarian objectives facing a passive country. 
Vith unrestricted distortionary and lump-sum fiscal instruments, the 
national first-best is attained through a combination of a tax on interest 
received by residents from foreigners or interest paid by residents to 
foreigners and an unfunded social security retirement scheme (or its 
equivalent with age-independent transfers). The borrowing/lending tax is 
the intertemporal equivalent of the optimum tariff in this model. The 
optimum policy package is time-consistent for the national utilitarian 
planner because distortionary taxes are introduced in addition to 
,<-;.,unrest;cictedc,lump-.,sum.,tax and .transfer policies. In, this model, the 
national command optimum is achieved so that the standard 
time-inconsistency problem in the overlapping generations economy with 
potential capital levies does not arise (see Fischer [1980], Kydland and 
Prescott [1980], Turnovsky and -Brock [1980], and,,Chamley '[1985]). Ve next 
derive the optimal unfunded social security policy when no distortionary 
tax instruments are allowed and show that lump-sum tax policies can target 
both intergenerational distribution objectives and interest rate 
objectives. The trade-off between these two objectives targetted by a 
single instrument is discussed. The (constrained) national optimum in this 
case is not in general time consistent. 
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In the .fifth section, we introduce technological externalities in 
·public policy .formation by adding internationally enjoyed public goods.·--·A 
world Pareto optimum with respect to-household preferences requires 
cooperative exhaustive public spending programs. · Public goods-provision~ ts 
inefficient .under noncooperative behavior by national chauvinistic social 
·:-,planners in general. ·However attainment of· a Pareto optimum does· not 
require that the financing of public expenditures be coordinated, just the 
level of such expenditures at each date. As before, a Pareto optimal plan 
with respect to planners' preferences does in general require cooperation 
. in financing plans as well. 
2. THE IODEL 
The model economy is a two-country version of the Diamond [1965] 
overlapping generations model with capital accumulation following Buiter 
[1981]. A country is defined by two characteristics. First there is a 
factor of production (labor) that is immobile between countries. Second 
ir,,'. .. ,ea.ch country .has.,a.fiscal authority whose ability to tax residents may 
differ from its ability to tax nonresidents and/or whose ability to tax 
domestic sources of income may differ from its ability to tax foreign 
sources of income. These very general "boxes" will be filled with specific 
examples in what follows. 
Each generation survives for two periods, and the economy has an 
infinite horizon. The populations of the two countries, home and foreign,·
"' 
are equal in size, growing at the same constant proportional rate n. 
Vithin each country the households are homogeneous, but tastes and initial 
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wealth differ across borders. A constant returns to scale technology, 
· which may be country- specific, is' available-to perfectly competitive -firms 
producing a single output. 
There is a public sector in each country which can effect 
.... ,-- -, .intergenerational transfers between members of its-own population--··-_,. 
(currently alive or yet to be born), levy distortionary taxes and provide 
publicly consumed goods. Each government is represented by a single player 
possessing a national social welfare function which it seeks to maximize 
observing a suitable solvency constraint (discussed below). There is no 
sovereigndefault·risk. Taxes and subsidies can be levied on domestic 
investment, foreign asset income received by domestic residents or payments 
. to foreign investors •._. There also can be lump-,- sum trans£ers to and taxes on 
domestic households that do not represent immediate direct 
intergenerational trans~_ers. Any budget deficits or surpluses are financed 
by issuing or retiring one-period real government debt. 
The utility function for a representative household of each generation 
.,.,.;,- in both countries.;;,is _assumed, to, be intertemporally additively separable, 
and, without loss of generality, the single-period felicity functions are 
assumed identical between periods and generations within a country. The 
utility for a household in the home country which is young at time tis 
,. -t,\ 
(1) 
where .. c! is consumption at time t of the household when young, c! is 
consumption at time t+l of the household when old, and the discount rate p 
is between zero and one. Collective consumption is not considered in the 
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next two sections, as reflected in (1). Public goods are introduced in an­
additively separable manner-'in·-Section 5•. •The utility function for the-··· 
counterpart household in the foreign country is 
where asterisks indicate foreign variables and parameters. The felicity 
functions u(c) and u *(c)* are twice continuously differentiable, increasing 
and strictly concave. Further, we assume that 
(2) lim u'(c) = oo, and lim u'(c) = 0 
c...:i O c...:im 
* with corresponding Inada conditions-for u The home country production 
function in intensive form is given by 
where y and k denote per capita output and capital, respectively, for the 
home country. f is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and 
strictly concave, and the Inada conditions are assumed to hold. The 
foreign production function, assumed to have the same properties as f is 
National wealth for the home country,is the sum of the domestic 
capital stock and net claims on foreigners h minus home government debt b. 
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We do not need to distinguish between direct foreign investment and foreign 
lending because they are perfect substitutes in this model. 
At time t, total world output is divided between current consumption 
and capital stocks for period t+l. Either country's output can be used to 
form capital for the next period .in .either country. . However existing -·- · ..•• , , .. 
capital stocks cannot be reallocated across borders for producing current 
outputs. 
The budget constraint for a young household at time tin the home 
country under free capital mobility is 
(3) 
where r t+l is the world rate of interest, wt = w(kt) = f(kt) - ktf' (kt) is 
the wage rate, rI is the lump- sum tax paid while young, and r! is the 
· lump- sum tax paid while old. The competitive household maximizes (1) with 
respect to its consumption plan c{ and c! subject to (3), taking as given 
wt , rt+l , r{ and r!. Household saving by the young and consumption by 




The equilibrium conditions for the home private sector are 
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and 
in addition to (4) and (5). The equilibrium conditions for the foreign 
private sector can be obtained by attaching asterisk superscripts to home 
country functions and variables. 
In the presence of home country taxes on borrowing or lending abroad, 
r must be replaced by the sum of the world interest rate and the tax rate 
on foreign investment income or payments in both (6) and (7). If fixed 
capital formation in the home country receives a subsidy, then r must be 
replaced by the world interest rate minus the subsidy rate in (7) alone. 
A national income accounting identity yields 
where xt is the per capita primary external deficit (or trade deficit) for 
the home country. 
The material balance constraint for the world economy is 
(9) 
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Under the assumptions made, ,a competitive equilibrium for this economy 
* exists given k0 and positive initial- capital.•stocks i,k0 and ·ko", and given· , 
that all distortionary taxes are linear. 
3. - PAB.ETD OPTilllL POLICIES 
- In the two-country overlapping generations model, a competitive 
equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal unless the equilibrium growth path 
is dynamically inefficient. In Buiter and Kletzer [1990a] it is shown that 
fiscal policy using only nondistortionary instruments can assure a Pareto 
optimum. If arbitrary age-dependent lump-sum transfers are feasible, then 
efficiency can be achieved through the use of separate balanced budget 
fiscal policies in each-country..That is balanced budget intergenerational 
transfer schemes for each country separately suffice. Under free capital 
mobility, unfundedsocial security.retirement schemes in each country-do 
not need to be coordinated to assure a Pareto optimum with respect to 
household preferences. 
"When arbitrary unfunded social security policies are available, 
relaxing the constraint that the public sector budget be balanced in every 
period provides no additional ability to either government for achieving 
national welfare objectives. However, if restrictions are placed on the 
contemporaneous intergenerational transfers that can be made, then 
deficit-financing (or surplus accumulations) increases the instruments 
available to policy makers. 
. 
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It.is important.to note that the proposition that free international 
capital mobility and "uncoordinated,··unfunded ·social security-programs ~for-,·• -­
each of the two countries are capable of ensuring that a competitive 
economy attains a Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation refers to Pareto·. 
·optimality with respect ·to the•individual household's preferences. ·In what ,·,, 
follows the expressions "Pareto optimal" or "Pareto efficient" when used 
without qualification will always mean "Pareto optimal" (or Pareto 
efficient) with respect to the utility functions of current and future 
individual households. In this paper, we introduce a utilitarian objective 
function for the social planner in each country and show that with free 
capital mobility and separate unfunded social security retirement schemes a 
Pareto optimum with respect to the nationalistic preferences of the two 
planners can be achieved provided these separate1 tax-transfer schemes are 
coordinated. A noncooperative equilibrium-using only lump-sum instruments 
will still yield a Pareto optimum with respect to household preferences, 
but not with respect to national chauvinistic utilitarian planners' 
r.:, . preferences. ..None oL.these policies will, in general, be time- consistent. 
In an unrestricted, unfunded social security scheme the budget 
constraint for the home country each period is given by 
2 
1 r t-1(10) 'Tt + T+n = 0. 
The effect of age-dependent lump- sum transfers is ·to '·change the saving ·of···· 
the current young, altering the level of wealth for the next period. 
In the open economy, a reduction in aggregate (world) saving is required if 
the equilibrium path for the competitive laissez-faire economy is 
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dynamically inefficient. This is achieved.by taxing the young and 
subsidizing the consumption of~ the ·old .·in at least- one of ·,the :countries .. · · 
(possibly it is·necessary in both). 
The following result is proved in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a]. 
Proposition 1 
A Pareto optimal plan can be attained as a competitive equilibrium 
allocation under free capital mobility and unfunded social security 
schemes. Coordination of the latter is unnecessary. 
,Note that Proposition 1 does not say that a competitive equilibrium 
allocation under perfect capital mobility will be Pareto efficient for any 
set of national unfunded social security schemes. Clearly, there may.be 
unfunded national social security schemes ·that support a dynamically 
inefficient equilibrium. It does say that there exist uncoordinated 
unfunded national social security schemes that support a Pareto optimum. 
Suppose that a national planner possesses an utilitarian welfare 




U: ;]i[u(c~+i) + /Ju(c~+i)] + U: h]Pu(c~_ 1) 
i=O 
where pis the social generational discount rate of the planner. This 
function is analogous to the social welfare objective used by Calvo and 
Obstfeld [1988] in the closed economy. 
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The foreign planner seeks to maximize 
In each of these functions the felicity of the current old is included and 
discounted at exactly the same rate as felicity while old of the current 
young or unborn. This is necessary if an unrestricted national command 
optimum is to be time-consistent (compare with Samuelson [1967, 1968]). 
Free international capital mobility and balanced budget age-dependent 
, transfer schemes for each country are adequate policy instruments to attain 
a Pareto optimum with respect, to these national welfare criteria. 
Proposition 2 
A Pareto optimum is achievable with respect to the national social 
* welfare objectives Sand S under perfect competition and free capital 
....mobility.,using separate national unfunded social security retirement 
schemes (that is schemes that are balanced nation-by-nation without 
international transfers). 
Proof 
* A Pareto optimum with respect to Sand S , given initial capital 
stocks and initial net foreign assets, is found by maximizing the 
Lagrangean given below for some J ~ O. 
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s0 + .1s; + i vJJ(k1) + / (k~) + kt + k~ - (1 + n)kt+J - (1 + n)k~+J 
t=O 
This yields the interior first-order conditions given in equations (13a) 
through (14c), the restrictions on the values of the Lagrange multipliers 
along an optimal path given in (15a, b, c) and the transversality 










(15c) Vt> 0 for all t 
(15d) 
(15e) 
Competitive individual lifetime optimization in both countries and 
perfect international financial capital mobility ensure that equations 
(.13a, b,,.c.)_.holcL ..National intergenerational transfers satisfying 
2 *2 
1 r~l *1 rt 1
rt+ 1 + n = 0 and rt + 1 +- n = 0 are enough to ensure that equations 
(14a, b) hold, since from the two household budget constraints it follows 
2 *2that there are always two instruments, rt+l and rt+l , to use to satisfy 
(14a, b) given prior choices of rt1 and r:!1 There will also be some 
nonnegative Pareto weight or national distributional weight A that 
satisfies (14c). It is easily checked that this Pareto weight will be 
constant over time. Dynamic inefficiency is obviously ruled out with 
cooperative behavior. It would in fact be ruled out even with Nash 
behavior, as it will always be in the interest of each national policy 
maker to transfer more resources to its own old (even unilaterally) if the 
interest rate were permanently below the growth rate. □ 
The policy choices for the home and foreign government are 
interdependent and must be made cooperatively to attain a Pareto optimum 
with respect to the two national social welfare functions. This point can 
be seen by noting that (14c) is obtained from the-following two first-order­
conditions for optimization of the Lagrangean in the above proof: 
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t 
[1 + n ] u, (c{) = flt ' and 
1 + p 
With noncooperative behavior (for instance with Nash behavior) these 
equations will not hold in general, because the two national players will 
not be facing the same shadow prices of capital. They will hold if the two 
national social welfare functions and the two national private sector 
production functions and utility functions are identical, if the initial 
* values of k and k are the same and if the initial value of his zero . 
. Note that in Proposition 2 the weight on foreign social welfare ,\ is, 
constant over all generations. In the individual Pareto problem (referred· 
to in Proposition 1) there can be a· separate 0 weight for every generation in· ·· 
each country. lie summarize this discussion as follows. 
Corollary 
Under free capital mobility, separate national unfunded social 
security retirement schemes must be chosen cooperatively to ensure 
that a Pareto optimum with respect to the national social welfare 
functions is attained as a competitive equilibrium allocation. 
The alternative of deficit-financed lump-sum transfer payments to 
-households-currently alive or budget surpluses to finance future transfers 
will only add to government's effective arsenal of fiscal instruments if 
restrictions are imposed on the scope of age-dependent transfer plans. In 
the closed infinite-horizon economy, Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] show that if 
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the transfers made to (or taxes paid by) the two generations living at any 
date must be equal, then public debt management is capable of ensuring that 
a competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient.. In Buiter and 
Kletzer [1990a] we extend this proposition to a two-county setting. Ve 
show that if there always is a next period (that is if the economy goes on 
forever), the ·ability ·•of each government to transfer from the current old 
to the current young with national balanced budgets is an adequate policy 
instrument to attain a Pareto efficient global capital accumulation path. 
However, the sign of the transfer to the private sector from the public 
sector can switch back and forth between periods in an efficient 
age-independent lump-sum tax and transfer scheme, implying that government 
debt at each date may, form.. a nonconvergent sequence. An adequate 
reformulation of the government solvency constraint is the following. :With 
just lump- sum taxes and transfers·· the budget identity of the home 
government is: 
1 ( )-1 2(1 + n) bt+1 _ (1 + rt) bt - rt - 1 + n rt- 1 
Here bt is home country government debt per member of home country 
generation t. Therefore, for T ~ 0 we have2: 
T-1 
n) -1~ -= (1 + £.Jb1 
t=O 
T-1 
+ II (1 + nrlu + ri)bo . 
i=l 
Ve require that the sequence {b 1}T=O possesses a convergent infinite 
19 








Under free capital mobility, age-independent transfer schemes which 
observe the modified public sector solvency constraint in each country 
can be found to assure that a competitive equilibrium allocation is a 
Pareto optimum with respect to the two national·planners' preferences. 
Proof 
The argument is almost identical to that for Proposition 2 and to the 
argument in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a] showing that age-independent 
lump-sum transfers can support a Pareto optimum with respect to individual 
household preferences. The revised public sector solvency constraint is 
satisfied if the net discounted transfers to each generation (discounted to 
birth) do not grow faster than the interest rate. Dynamic efficiency can 
be assured without violating this restriction. □ 
Corollary 
The public sector deficit-financing policies of the two governments 
require coordination, in general, to assure that a national social 
welfare Pareto optimum is attained for the planners as a competitive 
equilibrium with free capital mobility. 
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Another question which might be asked is what policy instruments are 
required to maximize a global utilitarian planner's objectives? In this 
case, a single .function is defined over the utilities of, successive· 
generations in both countries which can be written: 
{16) 
* where {fi .J and {fi.} are weights on the utilities of every household in the 
J J 
two populations respectively. These weights can be different for each 
generation in each country. Ve assume that O < ~ {(1 + n)' J:1 nj} 
~ {c1 + n)i ll n;} < ro. 
For time consistency of the global command optimum, it is in addition 
i 




(1 + n) i.II· nJ°* decline exponentiallrwith i ·. · This implies 
j=O 
* o < (1 + n)nj, (1 + n)n < 1 for j ~ o.1 
Clearly maximization of sf (for given household weights n1 and n1), 
subject to thecglobalmaterial,balance constraint in ..generalarequires 
lump- sum transfers between the two populations .. A global social welfare 
command optimum can only be supported as a competitive equilibrium with 
perfect international capital mobility if the fiscal authorities use both 
intergenerational transfers within each country (for example, either 
balanced-budget age-dependent lump-sum transfers or age-independent 
lump-sum transfers with deficits and surpluses observing the modified 
public sector solvency constraints) and lump- sum internationaLtransfers. 
The necessary conditions for a global social welfare optimum 
include--in addition to the conditions governing the behavior of the shadow 





* * *1(17e) 0t+1+iu '(ct+l+i) 
22 
(f7f) 
. The, first three ofthese are satisfied in any competitive -•equilibrium 
with perfect international capital mobility. The fourth condition. 
characterizes optimality with respect to the global social welfare function 
of the intergenerational distribution of resources within the home country. 
The fifth characterizes optimality of the intergenerational distribution of 
resources within the foreign country. The last condition characterizes 
optimality(in terms of the global social welfare function) of the 
international (or intragenerational) distribution of resources. This last 
condition implies that an international lump-sum transfer plan is, in 
general, required in addition to individual national unfunded social 
security policies to assure that .competitive equilibrium allocations are 
global social welfare optima. There must be scope for lump-sum 
redistribution between all economic agents alive at the same time, not just 
Ne: :; > among the economic .agents belonging to disjoint (national) subsets of the 
total world population. Only in rather uninteresting special cases (such 
as identical private utility functions and productions functions; identical 
initial capital stocks; zero initial net foreign assets, and equal 
valuation of home and foreign consumers in the global social welfare 
* function (nt+i = nt+i for all i)) will the achievement of the global 
command optimum not require lump-sum international redistribution. 
Vhen the global planner is restricted to follow national 
balanced-budget policies using lump-sum intergenerational redistribution 
only, neither the first-order condition for (unrestricted) international 
distributional optimality (17f) nor the two first-order conditions for 
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(unrestricted) national intergenerational distributional optimality 
(17d, e) will in general be satisfied.. Policies that influence the 
intergenerational distribution of,.resources -inevitably influence the world 
. rate. of interest. Typically-,.• -as shown in -Buiter ,and .Kletzer [l990a~ , •·· · 
redistribution towards the old will· raise the rate of ·interest.- -,-Even in an 
endowment economy without endogenous capital formation, an increase in the 
rate of interest will redistribute resources from borrowers to lenders. 
Therefore, unless the two countries happen to be in financial autarky 
in each period, an increase in the rate of interest will redistribute 
resources from one of them (the borrower) to the other (the lender). The 
restricted global planner will in general trade off at the margin the 
intergenerational distribution objectives within each country against the 
international distribution objectives. In our model, the endogeneity of 
the capital stock means that direct .."intergenerational redistribution in 
period twill also .influence the wage income of agents born in period t+l. 
If the two national production functions differ, this may provide another 
rt1•' ,; • • means. through,,which. the restricted global planner can pursue its 
international distributional objectives. 
The ability to effect international lump-sum transfers is indeed 
likely to be limited. We already discussed the possibility of using 
national intergenerational redistribution through-lump-sum taxes and 
transfers to influence capital formation and thus the wages paid to labor, 
the internationally immobile factor. A second-best approach to maximizing 
global social welfare objectives without the ability to effect lump-sum 
international transfers may well involve the use of any available 
distortionary tax and transfer instruments to influence the competitive 
payments to internationally immobile factors of production. Since in our 
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model labor is immobile across borders while new capital can be located in 
either country, a tax on or .subsidy to .-investment -in one -country wilLcause -<: 
the two, countries.' wage .rates to diverge. .Shifting capital between 
countries redistributes income.•between the"-young -of ,the·-two •countries·· ,,,_ , ,-,.,, 
through the payments to labor.. -.. Country- specific fiscal policies ,(e.g. 
lump-sum intergenerational redistribution, if available) which observe 
suitably modified public sector solvency constraints can then be used to 
distribute these altered national wages across generations within each 
population. The use of distortionary instruments to achieve "indirect" net 
international ·wealth-transfers is of course at most second best and would 
not be resorted to -if lump-sum international redistribution were an option. 
Ve now derive the constrained optimal policy combination for the 
global social planner without direct international redistribution (whether 
through lump-sum or distortionary taxes or transfers) but with 
country-specific taxes on or subsidies to the rentals of capital and with 
country-specific residence-based taxation of non-wage income. Note that we 
w:c .wish to rule. out ..alLdirect international redistribution between home 
country and foreign country residents. Since residents of either country 
can own capital in both countries, we impose the restriction that all net 
capital tax revenue collected from home country residents is redistributed 
in lump-sum fashion only to home country residents and similarly for the 
net capital tax revenue collected from foreign residents. The constraints 
to be ob~erved by the global planner are those of a competitive economy 
with perfect international capital mobility. 
The restricted global welfare optimum is·achieved,by maximizing SC -in 
(16) by influencing investment and consumption in both countries through 
the choice each period of the four lump-sum taxes r! , r!_ 1 , r:1 and 
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* 'ft-*2 1 , the two capital income tax rates Ot and Ot , and the two 
* residence- based interest income tax rates µt and µt ,subject to the 
following set of constraints. 
* * * (18) f(kt+i·) + kt+i· + f (k.t+i·) + kt+1. - (1 + n) (kt. +1+1,. + kt . +1+~.) 
2 
1 rt+i 1
(19) f(kt+i·) - kt+i·l' (kt+i·) - rt · - i > ct · 
+i + r t+1+i - µt+1+i +i 
2 
ct .+1, 
+ 1 + 




1 + rt+1+i - µt+1+i 
(21) 
+ µt -)k*t . + at .kt = 0·[U _/t ·]+1, +1, +1, +1, +1, 
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"(22) 
+ µ,*t -[(1 -at -)kt . + a*t .k*t ·] = 0
+i +i +i +i +i 
(2ij) 
Equations (21) and (22) represent balanced-budget constraints for the 
public sectors. Since there are assumed to be lump-sum taxes and transfers 
for national intergenerational redistribution (that is arbitrary unfunded 
national social security programs), no generality is lost with the 
assumption of ,a.balanced,budget. The proportion of the capital stock 
employed in the home country owned by home residents is at , and the 
proportion of the capital stock employed in the foreign country owned by 
* foreign citizens is at . Equations (21) and {22) reflect the restriction 
that all tax revenue collected from home country residents is redistributed 
in lump-sum fashion to this population only and similarly for foreign tax 
revenues. Wedges between the rates of interest received by foreign and 
home households can be imposed. The before-tax interest rater is the same 
in both countries through the assumption of perfect international capital 
mobility. It equals the marginal product of capital net of capital income 
taxes in the two countries: rt= f'(kt) - Ot = f*'(kt)* - Ot.* Private 
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residents in the home country get an aftertax rate of return on their 
* financial assets of rt - µtwhile foreign_residents earn·rt - µt • 
For this economy, we establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 4 
In the absence of feasible international lump-sum transfers, the 
second-best policy for the global utilitarian planner with access to 
country-specific taxes on capital income and residence-based interest 
taxes is to set a nonnegative tax on the returns to capital located in 
one country and a nonpositive tax on the returns to capital located in 
the other country, along with separate unfunded social security 
schemes or their equivalent in each country. Residence-based interest 
taxes are not used. 
Proof 
Solve the Lagrange problem for the maximization of SC given in (16) 
using constraints (18)-(25). The necessary conditions for an optimum 
* include equations (26) through (31). Vt , nt and nt are the Lagrange 
multipliers for constraints (18), (21) and (22) respectively. 
* (26) µt+i = µt+i = O 
* (27) [ int . + at .'l'lt . + (1 - at .)'l'lt .] (Jt .r +i +i ., +i +i ., +i +i 
28 
(29) ~t+i+l = (1 + n)(l + rt+i+l )
-1 
nt+i 
* -1 * (30) ~t+i+l = (l + n)(l + rt+i+l) nt+i 
Equation (26) says that residence-based taxes on asset income are not 
used in the restricted global optimum program. They obviously cannot 
effect any direct international transfer. In addition they cannot be used 
to move the two national capital intensities and thus the two national wage 
· rates in opposite directions. They can be used to influence the before-tax 
world interest rate and thus the distribution of income between a debtor 
•and a creditor nation, but that same objective can be achieved more 
effectively using the other fiscal instruments. There is no case for 
distorting the global allocation of saving. 
* Because the three multipliers¢,~ and~ must all be nonnegative at 
the constrained optimum, there .will.in.general be.a~nonzero tax.or subsidy .. 
to investment in at least one country. This follows from equations (27) 
and (28) which imply 
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The two capital tax rates will therefore never have the same signs (unless 
they are both zero). □ 
, There are two reasons why a global planner without access to lump-sum 
international redistribution instruments may want to influence capital 
formation using dist·ortionary ·taxes~-" ·First, ·such· polrcies ·will influence-· 
the world rate of interest; to the extent that there is net foreign 
investment, such changes in the world rate of interest will redistribute 
income between residents of the debtor country and the creditor country. 
Second, changes in the national capital stocks influence the wages received 
by the future young generation in the two countries. 
From equations (27) and (28) it can be seen that a distortionary tax 
will not be imposed on the income from capital located in a country when 
that country's capital stock of wholly owned by domestic residents: Ot = 0 
** = * Thus if. at= at= 1 for all haveif at= 0, and Ot 0 if at= O. t we 
rt= !'(kt)= f*'(kt)* for all t , and the unrestricted command optimum will 
prevail. If ·there is never any net ownership of foreign assets·, real or 
ti:«''•· , .. , .financial .. (which,,is..implied by--but does not. imply--the absence of gross 
foreign ownership), there is no argument for changing the world rate of 
interest in order to alter the global distribution of income between 
debtors and creditors. If there is no gross foreign ownership of real 
capital, there also is no social return to trying to.change wages (the 
income of the internationally immobile factor) by influencing physical 
capital formation through distortionary ·taxes on the income from capital. 
Vith perpetual financial autarky (gross and net) all domestic capital 
formation must be financed out of domestic saving, and.the excess burden of 
the distortion associated with the domestic capital formation process in a 
country is borne exclusively by residents of that country. In a closed 
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economy distortionary taxes would not be used, and neither will they be 
, used in this formally open but effectively ,.closed economy. 
The second case where distortionary taxes will not be used in the 
restricted global optimum is where the .shadow .. ¥alues ofthe .separate 
* national public sector budget constraints are 'equal (Tit =· Tit for all't). 
This represents the case in which, in the unrestricted global optimum, 
there never are any net lump-sum international transfers. 
The remaining necessary conditions for the restricted global optimum 
are given below. 
u' (cti) 
-------= 1 + rt . 1 = +i+ 
ni+tu' (cti+1) 
i 
(1 + n) i IJ nJ°u' (cti) = 
J°=O 
plus the . .,usual .transversality conditions. 
They are easily seen to reduce to the first-order conditions for the 
* unrestricted global optimum given in (17b through d) when Tit= Tit for all 
* t. Vb.en at= at= 1 for all t the equations of motion for the shadow 
prices are the same as in the unrestricted optimum, but the initial 
* conditions for T/ and T/ need not be the same. 
As noted in the earlier discussion, a "distortionary" tax/subsidy 
program is useful for global utilitarian social welfare optimization when 
there is foreign ownership of capital in at least one country in 
competitive equilibrium and the special case that no international lump-sum 
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transfers are desired in the unrestricted optimization exercise does not 
hold. 
A tax on the earnings of home capital (with or without the feature 
that any revenue collected from foreign owners of domestic capital is 
returned to them as lump-sum payments) reduces the capital.stock -in.the 
home country, depressing home wages and raising foreign wages. This 
imperfect substitute policy for international lump-sum transfers creates a 
distortion by breaking the equality of the marginal productivities of 
capital across borders. In equilibrium, a least distortionary policy will 
entail a positive subsidy to capital in one country and a positive tax on 
capital earnings in the other, in the general case. 
4. POLICIES FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL WELFARE OBJECTIVES 
l&ile the policies necessary for a competitive equilibrium growth path 
for the two- country economy under free financial capital mobility to be a 
Pareto optimum do not need to be coordinated between governments, a Pareto 
.optimum.with .resp.ect. t.o two utilitarian national planners' preferences and 
a global social welfare optimum are attained only through coordinated 
policy selection. In this section we study the national optimal behavior 
of a single national planner who takes as given current and future policy 
choices of the other national planner. Ve can look at this as an 
intertemporal version of the familiar static trade policy analysis which 
considers the interaction of an active, optimizing national policy maker 
who exploits the country's size in the world market and a passive policy 
maker who neither responds to the other country's policy measures nor 
attempts to exploit his country's market power. The passive country 
(labeled "foreign" in what follows) is assumed not to have imposed any 
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distortionary taxes or subsidies. It may have an internal lump-sum 
intergenerational redistribution ,scheme, 0but this is assumed independent of · 
the,policies pursued·by the active home country policy maker. Ve can of 
course interpret the behavior of our "active" home country government as 
noncooperative,,open-loop Nash"behavior. To-characterize a,fuH Nash · °'•½ 
equilibrium, the foreign government's behavior will have to be specified 
analogously: like the home country policy maker, it will not take world 
market prices as parametric. 
For the open-loop Nash equilibrium when both governments have access 
to instruments for national lump-sum intergenerational redistribution and 
to distortionary instruments such as capital rental taxes, interest taxes 
or subsidies, and taxes or subsidies on foreign lending (borrowing), we 
state the following proposition without proof. 
Proposition 5 
As in the static trade model, a noncooperative (open-loop Nash) 
. equilib:cinm.,under. nationalistic policy making when national policy 
makers have access to distortionary instruments yields a Pareto 
suboptimal world allocation of resources, in this case capital. 
If in the one active and one.passive country scenario the,home country 
planner takes the lump-sum transfer scheme between foreign country 
residents chosen by the foreign government as given, then the optimal 
.choice of.policies by the home planner with preferences .defined only over 
domestic residents' utilities as in equation (11) will include 
distortionary taxes. In conventional static multicountry trade theory the 
optimal policy intervention for national welfare objectives is an optimum 
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tariff. In this model all international trade is intertemporal so the 
analogue of the optimum.tariff is a tax on private,foreign lending or 
borrowing .. ·Such a tax equates the domestic rate of intertemporal product· 
transformation.(1 + the home country.marginal productiv.ity.of.capital)..with .... 
. (1 + the rate of return to domestic residents -from claims ·-on foreign 
capital). The tax (the capital market equivalent to a tariff or export 
tax) raises the foreign rate of interest paid to home country residents by 
foreigners if the home country is a net creditor, or lowers the rate of 
interest paid by domestic residents to foreigners if the home country is a 
net debtor. 
The optimum policy package for the home country utilitarian planner is 
easily derived. A convenient way of characterizing the optimum problem of 
the domestic planner maximizing St (given in equation (11)) is by viewing 
her as being able to choose directly for all i ~ 0 the domestic consumption 
1 2streams {ct+i , ct+i-l} and the stream of trade deficits {xt+i} subject to 
the following constraints. 
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* * * (37) r t+i - f '(kt+i) = 0 
Equations (32) and (33) are the resource constraints of the home 
country and the foreign country respectively. Equation (34) is the net 
external asset accumulation equation for the home country. Equations (35) 
and (36) characterize competitive household equilibrium in the foreign 
* country. The world rate of interest r equals the foreign marginal product 
of capital. Since the foreign government is passive we lose no generality 
by omitting all foreign taxes. The home government has three instruments 
each period, r{ , r!_ 1 and the lending or borrowing tax. These are 
sufficient to allow it to choose as competitive equilibrium values of c{ , 
2ct-J and xt in each period any values of these variables that satisfy the 
home country resource constraint given kt • The following conditions are· 
satisfied in equilibrium: 
(38) 
and 
, .The optimum .fiscal policy for the home government combines a foreign ·· 
lending or borrowing tax with an efficient unfunded social security scheme. 
The domestic rate of interest equals the marginal productivity of home 
capital. 
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Even if multilateral agreements restrict the use of standard 
protective measures to gain national advantage in international exchange;-:-,-~-,-­
scope for policy· intervention to raise-national social ··welfare at the 
expense of foreign welfare -remains in the overlapping ·generations· model. 
Suppose discriminatory taxes on capital income by source, investment 
subsidies, taxes on international lending or borrowing and similar tax 
incentives are eliminated by international agreements. Because of the 
absence of Ricardian neutrality, lump-sum transfer fiscal policies can 
alter the expenditure plan for the home private sector. Such intertemporal 
expenditure ·switching can be used strategically by the government to raise 
its national social welfare level at the expense of the foreign 
government's welfare objectives. Of course, if only lump-sum transfer 
policies across households within each country are allowed, then the 
resulting competitive equilibrium for the world economy yields a Pareto 
optimal allocation unless it is dynamically inefficient. Further, if 
unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum transfers are feasible, balanced-budget 
r. ... policies achieve. the same set of outcomes as do policies which involve 
deficit-financing (subject to _the modified public sector solvency 
constraint). However with restrictions on the form of social security 
retirement schemes a strategic role for the deficit policy of a government 
with nationalistic social welfare objectives exists. 
* Ve now assume that the foreign:planner maximizes St with respect to 
his national unfunded social security policies at all dates, taking the 
unfunded ·social.security plan of 'the home government·as fixed and that the 
.home country government maximizes St.in the same manner. An open-loop Nash 
equilibrium in fiscal policies using only national balanced-budget lump-sum 
transfer policies yields a Pareto optimal allocation with respect to 
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household preferences, and a suboptimal one with respect to national social 
planners' .preferences and with respect ,to the global- social welfare· 
function. Starting from a global social welfare optimum or from a national 
social welfare Pareto optimum, if both governments aim to maximize their 
•own national .. social welfare through noncooperative strategfes, ·they c:will 1n · 
general select national lump-sum intergenerational redistribution policies 
which cause deviations from the necessary conditions for a national social 
welfare Pareto optimum or a global optimum. 
Since the open-loop Nash policies we consider do not in general 
support national command optima, the time-consistency of these policies is 
not guaranteed. Ve ensure credibility "proforma" by endowing our 
governments with compulsive honesty ("I cannot tell a lie"). Vhether these 
policies can be supported with more general "punishments" or other trigger 
strategies involving memory is an open question and beyond the scope of the 
present paper. 
Vithout fully characterizing the Nash equilibrium we can establish its 
key properties .by ..considering the optimization problem for the home 
government which maximizes St with respect to the sequence of domestic 
lump-sum taxes and transfers {(r{+i , r!+i-l)i=O} (and taking as given the 
*1 *2 w 
sequence of foreign lump-sum taxes and transfers {(rt+i , rt+i-l)i=O} 
subject to the following constraints: 
(39) u' (cti) - P(l + rt+i+J)u'(c!+i) = 0 
2 2 
1 7 t+i 1 ct+i, (40) = ct . +f(kt+i) - kt+if' (kt"+i) - T t+i - 1 +i 1 + rt · 1 + rt · 1+H +H 
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*I *1 * * *2(41) u (ct+i) - f3 (1 + rt+i+1)u '(ct+i) = 0 
*2 *2ct .*1 'T t+i *1 +i(42) * * * * * -f (kt+i) kt+if '(kt+i) "t+i - 1 = ct+i + 1 + rt+i+1 + rt+i+1 
(43) 
*2 
*1 ct+i-1(44) = ct+i + 1 + n 
(45) f(kt .) + kt . - (1 + n) kt . 1 + xt .+i +i +i+ +i 
2 *2 
. 1 "t+~1 *1 "t+~1and balanced budget constraints "t+i + 1 + n = 0 and "t+i + 1 + n = 0 • 
Equations (39)-(42) are necessary conditions for privately optimal 
household consumption and saving decisions in both countries, while (43) is 
the necessary condition for the foreign government's choice of fiscal 
policy to achieve an efficient (in terms of the foreign national social 
welfare function) foreign intergenerational distribution plan. By-writing 
. ,... .(43), we are not directly characterizing the Nash equilibrium in fiscal 
policies. Ve instead use it to show that the necessary condition for a 
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.national social welfare Pareto optimum will not be satisfied by the home 
government's fiscal policy when the respective first-order-condition is 
fulfilled by its foreign counterpart. 
After some algebra, the necessary conditions for a constrained 
national optimum include 
1 
j + n ] i+ / ( j ) / / ( 1 ) 
= [ [ 1 + p u ct+i+l + 1t+i+1u ct+i+l 
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* * where 1t+i , 1t+i , qt+i , xt+i , xt+i and vt+i are the Lagrange 
multipliers for constraints (39, 41, 43, 40, 42 and 46), respectively. · 
* vt + xt - xt measures the change in the optimized value of the home country 
national social welfare function brought about by a small increase in the 
resources available to the home country in period t (which contributes vt 
through the external asset accumulation equation (46)), effected by 
increasing the resources available to generation tin the home country and 
reducing the resources available to generation tin the foreign country by 
* that small amount (which contributes xt - xt through (40) and (42), the 
lifetime budget constraints of home and foreign generations t). Since the 
home country has unrestricted domestic intergenerational redistribution 
* instruments, vt + xt - ~twill be nonnegative. 
The solution implies that 
and 
That is if ht+i+l > 0 , then the- .noncooperative .national optimum lump"'.'asum . 
fiscal policy for the home country reduces national saving (by 
redistributing from the young to the old), and if ht+i+l < 0, the 
noncooperative national optimum policy raises national saving beyond the 
level that would be prescribed in a national social welfare Pareto optimum. 
For example suppose that the initial capital stock is the same in the 
two countries, that u = u * and f = f* , but that the private discount rates 
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differ. Let the national social "generational" rates of discount coincide 
, with the respective private time .preference rates. In.a Nash .equilibrium • 
(either. closed- loop or open- loop), .the more-patient country~ s ·fiscal 
authority raises social security retirement payments (hence, taxes on the 
young), while the less patient country's government reduces social 
security, relative to their respective cooperative equilibrium policies. 
The government of the (patient) creditor country attempts to raise the 
world rate of interest by reducing its national saving relative to the 
cooperative level while the government of the (impatient) debtor country 
tries to lower the world rate of interest by increasing its national 
saving. In the case described, the net result would be no net change in 
the world rate of interest in the Nash equilibrium relative to the 
cooperative equilibrium. The frustrated attempts to achieve international 
redistribution through changes in the world rate of interest, reflected in 
1 * values of rt+i that are higher and values of rt+i that are lower than the 
cooperative values, result in inferior domestic intergenerational 
H·. ,distributions .in the. two countries. 
Ve summarize these results in Proposition 6. 
Proposition 6 
Nondistortionary (lump-sum tax) fiscal policy can be designed to gain 
national advantage in international trade with respect to a 
utilitarian national social welfare objective. Nash equilibriums in 
.,unfunded social security retirement schemes,.are.not J>areto efficient· 
for national planner objectives but do attain equilibrium growth paths 
which are Pareto optimal with respect to household preferences. 
41 
Noncooperative selection of fiscal policies when distortionary tax 
, .,_• '" ,, instruments are_ .unavailable creates no ,loss .,in total. ,world1 surplus for,.-/-,,••, 
. households: we stay on the world contract-0 curve (defined -with respect·,to·</ "'· 
household preferences). However noncooperative fiscal management·-ieads t-o -- ·· 
movements along this world contract curve.-·. Starting"from··a-national social 
welfare Pareto optimum, the home country will choose to deviate from the 
unfunded social security scheme necessary to support this plan in an 
attempt to raise national welfare unilaterally. This increase in utilities 
for home resident households is at the expense of foreign residents. No 
overall distortion (in the individual Pareto sense) is created; the effect 
of noncooperative policy selection with binding constraints on the use of 
all distortionary taxes and subsidies is to redistribute welfare 
internationally. 
Because any unfunded social security scheme can be duplicated using 
age-independent lump-sum transfers observing the modified public sector 
solvency constraint, public sector debt management can be used to pursue 
,, national gain jn international exchange if arbitrary age-dependent lump- sum 
transfers are restricted. Social security transfer programs and 
deficit-financing of lump-sum fiscal policies can be used strategically to 
promote national welfare objectives if Ricardian equivalence fails and 
first- best (for the individual country) distortionary .. policy instruments 
are restricted. 
5. COORDINATION_ OF PUBLIC SPENDING PROGRAMS 
Ve have shown that coordination of fiscal policies in the two-country 
overlapping generations model is unnecessary for achieving a Pareto optimal 
capital accumulation and consumption plan in the absence of distortionary 
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taxes and subsidies, technological externalities and noncompetitive 
,,••,,l, •• ~-~; < 
,,.. '><.: ---·- .behavior. Free :international· capital tmobility allowing·:equalization .of· 
• ; rates of return to capital across borders,.is .adequate.to assure. efficiency.,.:,.--,u 
if lump-sum tax policies are available to utilitarian planners in each 
--•· country-. -The latter assures that a dynamically inefficient· path· is· not 
followed. 
In the absence of international technological externalities and 
internationally consumed public goods, noncooperative lump-sum tax policies 
chosen by utilitarian planners do not yield losses of world total surplus 
(in terms of 'household preferences) in conventional competitive economies. 
The adverse impact of the home country's policy on foreign welfare conveyed 
through interest rate changes is not a technological externality but rather 
a distributional consequence of economic interdependence through the 
competitive price system that is a pure pecuniary externality. 
In this section we add an internationally consumed public good to the 
model. Both governments contribute to the world public good supply which 
is nonexcludable.andnoncongestible. There is a case for international 
coordination of exhaustive public spending on the national provision of 
international public goods due to the presence of a technological 
externality, but again financing policies do not necessarily require 
coordination to ensure Pareto optimality with respect to private 
preferences. 
The consumption externality is introduced into the household utility 
function in an additive separable manner. The utility function for the 
home and foreign households are now 
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.and 
* respectively. v and v are increasing, strictly concave, twice 
continuously differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions. The 
utilitarian national social welfare functions are unchanged. For the home 
country for example we have 
As before we can restrict our attention to balanced-budget financing of 
public expenditures with unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum taxes and 
transfers, because adding the possibility of deficit-finance subject to our 
modified public sector solvency constraint does not increase the set of 
,.:.instruments ..,,av:ailable4-tO the governments. The budget constraint for the 
home government is 
2 
1 rt- 1 
-rt - T+n + 9t = 0 
and for the foreign government 
*2
*1 r t-1 * 
- 'T t - T+n + 9t = 0 
where gt * and gt * are the public expenditures by each country at time t. 
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Total supply and consumption of the public good is given by 
In the definitions of utility for households we assumed that per capita 
supply of the public good in terms of the number of current young in a 
single country enters utility. While the denominator is somewhat odd, this 
measure of public good consumption is convenient because of the constant 
population growth rate. It also captures the notion of nonrivalness of 
global public consumption goods vis-a-vis home country and foreign country 
residents. 
Consider again the case where the home country planner, in the pursuit 
of national welfare, sets its. lump-sum taxes and exhaustive public spending 
in open-loop Nash fashion. The foreign planner keeps the paths of its 
lump-sum tax instruments and of its exhaustive public spending fixed. 3 
Home country national chauvinistic planner optimal public spending and 
li: . i•,unfwided .,sociaL,s.ecurit.y policies,• disallowing distortionary tax 
incentives, satisfy the necessary conditions 
and 
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where 'Yt is the shadow value of the constraint given in (51): competitive 
''"i' · , hoine-icountry private'0 optimization·over consumption :plans '.'under free~ capital 
mobility. 
The sign of 'Yt for each t, is obtained from equations (48)-(50), which 
are unaffected because of the separability of public goods in the utility 
functions: if equilibrium external lending is positive, then 'Yt is 
negative, and conversely. A creditor country government with utilitarian 
objectives will wish to restrain saving and thus lending to the rest of the 
world. Since the social security scheme that reduces saving raises the 
ratio of·consumptionwhile young to consumption while old, public good 
provision is adjusted by the last term in equation (52) to correct the 
marginal utility of private good consumption while young for this 
distortion from the small country necessary condition for optimal 
intergenerational transfers. 
In the national chauvinistic uncoordinated world economy, public goods 
are underprovided (or bads overprovided). The necessary condition for a 
i1z; •. • J>areta optimaLal-location of the public good is 
where At gives the distribution of .welfare across national populations in 
the particular Pareto optimum. Coordination of spending policies is 
required to ensure that (54) holds. However, uncoordinated unfunded social 
security schemes or-equivalent public expenditure financing policies do not 
·interfere with the attainment of a Pareto optimum with respect to household 
preferences. As before, the use of social security schemes or 
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deficit-finance (in the absence of unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum 
't, .. ta:xes ·and.transfers) vto · gain. advantage ,in·'international"cintertemporal·:•trade:s -
leads to an inefficient outcome with respect to national social welfare 
functions but only has a distributional effect on aggregate household 
welfare. The use of lump-sum taxes to alter world interest rates and 
pursue national intergenerational distribution objectives changes the 
distribution of private (marginal utilities of) consumption across 
generations. Vhile the Pareto optimal levels of provision of public goods 
are affected by this, it does not cause a departure from Pareto optimality. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of Ricardian debt neutrality, lump-sum transfers 
between households within a country can be used by governments to attain 
advantage in international lending and borrowing. The optimum policy for a 
· utilitarian planner with nationalistic objectives facing a passive rest of 
the world is a combination of a tax on foreign borrowing or lending and a 
c. ._ .f.1,.sy:stem...;of,,cnat,ionaLintergenerational .lump- sum transfers. The former is the. 
intertemporal analogue of an optimum tariff and targets the world interest 
rate, lowering it for a debtor and raising it for a creditor. The lump-sum 
fiscal policy targets the desired distribution of welfare over residents. 
Thus with arbitrary domestic unfunded social security available, optimum 
national policy towards international transactions is the same as in the 
infinitely-lived representative agent. Vhen in addition to domestic 
lump-sum unfunded social security distortionary instruments are available 
to national policy makers, a noncooperative equilibrium in the world 
economy leads to a Pareto inefficient consumption and production plan just 
as in the static trade model. 
47 
In an integrated world economy, when governments do not have access to 
-, distortionary tax instruments, lump-,-sum,-tax-.based -£.iscaLpolicy can ,be,,,u-sed--~--~ 
strategically to improve a country's intertemporal terms of trade. In this 
case, one instrument is used to optimize with respect to two goals, and a 
trade-off exists between domestic intergenerational distribution and 
international redistribution through interest rate manipulation. Such 
policies are nondistortionary in the world economy and cause no overall 
welfare loss, but they do affect the distribution of welfare across 
countries. 
The·incorporation of exhaustive public spending through the provision 
of global public goods introduces an allocational efficiency argument for 
the coordination of fiscal policies. However it is the coordination of 
public spending across borders and not of the financing mixes to achieve 
this spending that is required to achieve Pareto efficiency. 
Interdependence of fiscal policies involves creates purely distributional 
conflicts when only lump-sum taxes and transfers and deficits are involved. 
48 
NOTES 
1Separate tax-transfer schemes are tax-transfer schemes that are 
balanced nation by nation i.e. that do not involve direct international -
transfers. Ve can widen this definition to include unbalanced public 
sector budgets as long as one nation's public debt is serviced with taxes 
on that nation's residents only. Separate tax-transfer schemes can either 
be coordinated or uncoordinated. 
0 
2 Ve adopt the notational convention that IT (1 + n)- 1(1 + ri) = 1 
i=1 
-1 
and that L/t = 0. 
t=O 
3 Vhile it doesn't matter for the results that follow we can view the 
fixed paths of foreign lumps-sum taxes to be in accordance with the 
necessary conditions for an efficient intergenerational distribution plan 
across foreign residents. Foreign exhaustive public spending similarly can 
be taken to be fixed at what would be the national Pareto optimal level for 
some particular relative weight (A say) of foreign national social welfare 
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